# Information Governance Incidents closed during 1st. April to 30th. June 2017

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**Information and technology
for better health and care**

# Contents

# Introduction

This is the published report of closed level 2[1] Information Governance Serious Incidents Requiring Investigation (IG SIRIs) recorded on the IG Toolkit Incident Reporting Tool. This type of report will be published on a quarterly basis as specified in the IG SIRI Publication Statement[2]. It covers IG SIRI level 2 incidents closed during the period of 1st. April to 30th. June 2017, following investigation by the local organisation(s) concerned.

# Content of the report

The report below consists of **44 closed incidents** reported to the Information Commissioner's Office (ICO), Department of Health (DH) and NHS England (NHSE) by Health or Adult Social Care organisations or suppliers (as advised within the IG SIRI Guidance issued 29th. May 2015).

The report contains the organisation name, date the incident was closed, scale (e.g. the number of data subjects affected presented as a range), a description of the incident and data involved. All information displayed below is as reported by the organisation(s) concerned. Where necessary, personal information included within the incidents has been redacted.

An auto closure feature introduced in June 2015 closes all open incidents that have not been updated by the organisation for 90 days[3]. In Appendix A are **53 incidents** which have been auto-closed by the system.

**Please note:**

- A 'Closed' incident means that the incident has been investigated by the local organisation and no further action is required unless the ICO make a request.

- Closed incidents may still be under review by the ICO and any actions taken will be published on the ICO website.

- This report does not include level 2 incidents which are still marked as open and therefore are still under investigation by the local organisation.

- Any near misses, Level 0 and 1 incidents voluntarily reported by organisations are also excluded as these incidents are not currently being monitored by the Health and Social Care Information Centre (HSCIC) but are useful for gathering intelligence, analysing trends and learning from previous occurrences. Details of such incidents are held by the local organisations.

# Next reports

The next closed level 2 IG SIRI report to be published will cover the period 1st July to 30th. October 2017.

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[1] Level 2 IG SIRIs are sufficiently high-profile cases or deemed a breach of the Data Protection Act or Common Law Duty of Confidentiality, and hence reportable to the Department of Health and Information Commissioner's Office. Organisations have used the IG SIRI assessment of severity facility to determine this level and report the incident. Further information on this can be found in the 'Checklist Guidance for Reporting, Managing and Investigating IG SIRIs'.
[2] https://www.igt.hscic.gov.uk/resources/IGIncidentsPublicationStatement.pdf.
[3] The organisation is notified by email 10 days in advance giving them time to update or close the incident before the auto closure occurs. If the organisation updates the record, it will not be auto closed. The organisation will also receive an email notification within 24 hours after auto closure, and if necessary can reopen the incident.

# Closed level 2 incidents reported during 1st April to 30th. June 2017

| ID | Organisation Name | Date of Closure | Volume | Details of Incident | Data |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IGI/12038 | Pinnacle Health Partnership | 20-Jun-17 | 35-286 | A Medicine Use Review service was set up with a referral notification attached.  A notification was automatically generated to inform GPs of action required (if any).  The notification was not correctly attached to the consent so that it was generating even if consent was not provided.<br><br>Upon further investigation with the commissioner, the understanding was that the service should only useful to the patient when consent was given.  This also appeared to be the understanding of the providers who believed consent to be incorrectly captured. | Service notification of Medicine use review sent to GP without specific patient consent.<br><br>Upon investigation with the service commissioner and providers it was stated that the service should have been locked to agreed and they were not aware of anyone who had not agreed to sharing the information.<br><br>As the service was a medicine use review, it was important that the information was shared with the GP to ensure that changes required to medications identified by the pharmacists could be actioned.<br><br>In 35 cases the referral was sent by the system without apparent consent by the patient.  A selection |

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| | | | | | of providers stated that consent had been given but incorrectly recorded.<br><br>In 251 cases the referral was generated for the pharmacy and may have been sent manually. Again, a sample of providers stated that consent had been given but incorrectly recorded. As these referrals are handled manually outside of the system we cannot confirm that these were sent.<br><br>The information shared was anonymised and downloaded to investigate what was shared. The details identified were information that should have been shared with the GP to ensure appropriate action was taken whether this was done by the referral or by another method. The Service Commissioner confirmed |

| ID | Organisation Name | Date of Closure | Volume | Details of Incident | Data |
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| | | | | | that this was the purpose of the service and should have taken place. |
| IGI/11859 | East Coast Community Healthcare CIC (Replacing NLA) | 01-Jun-17 | 500 | An e-mail containing patient identifiable data on approx. 500 patients was sent to Great Yarmouth & Waveney CCG in error. | NHS Patient data |
| IGI/11857 | East Coast Community Healthcare CIC (Replacing NLA) | 01-Jun-17 | 22 | Hospital bed state was sent out as normal, but the e-mail included an attachment that was the patient handover details which included full patient details. The e-mail was sent to the local acute before the error was spotted and the e-mail recalled. | NHS patient data |
| IGI/11847 | PENNINE CARE NHS FOUNDATION TRUST | 27-Jun-17 | 4 | As a member of staff was having difficult opening attachments on her laptop from her NHS account she forwarded them to her Yahoo personal email account. These were patient referrals for IV therapy | 4 Patient referrals sent to personal email account |
| IGI/11930 | MARIE STOPES INTERNATIONAL | 27-Jun-17 | 1 | Vasectomy client made appointment booking through the One Call booking service. Call centre agent made a mistake in noting the house number of the client, recording the house number as 20 instead of the correct 60. Correspondence was sent to the client at the incorrect address and opened by the resident. The resident notified LK (MSI) who notified One Call of the breach. The vasectomy client has received an apology. The correspondence has been returned to MSI.<br><br>A serious investigation has been commenced | Name, address, treatment type |

| ID | Organisation Name | Date of Closure | Volume | Details of Incident | Data |
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| IGI/11710 | North Cumbria University Hospitals NHS Trust | 27-Jun-17 | One | GP 2-week cancer referral was emailed to a member of staff within the Trust, who forwarded on to an inappropriate circulation list which included over 150 staff, including staff within a partner Trust.  The subject heading of the email included patient name and 2-week rule referral which would indicate to anyone receiving the email that the individual was being referred for possible cancer. | Patient referral letter including name, date of birth, address, phone numbers, GP name and address, type of potential cancer, summary previous medical history, current medication |
| IGI/11704 | NHS Chorley and South Ribble CCG | 02-Jun-17 | 500 | An email was sent out to PAG (Patient Action Group) members and Involvement Network members to inform them that the future Our Health Our Care events scheduled  to take place in May 2017 would be cancelled due to the general election in June 2017. The email was not sent in BCC and therefore the email address could be seen by all recipients."<br><br>The email was sent to about 500 people. The email was recalled.<br><br>There were 440 emails on the Involvement network and 38 on the PAG network. 27 emails were unable to be recalled. Of the 27 emails that were unable to be recalled they were all Chorley South Ribble CCG / Midlands and Lancashire Commissioning Support Unit, Lancashire Care Foundation Trust and Lancashire Teaching Hospitals addresses.<br><br>Please note - this is linked to IG/11718 reported by Greater Preston CCG. Each CCG is data controller for some of the information breached. The number of data | Personal email addresses |

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| | | | | subjects each CCG is responsible for is being established through the investigation. | |
| IGI/11674 | POOLE HOSPITALS NHS TRUST | 30-May-17 | 698 records in total | A maternity patient was discharged home, with her own hand-held notes which is normal. Unfortunately, on gathering her own records she also picked up the maternity central delivery admissions book, which the midwife had completed, this contains 698 sticky labels, four to each side. These labels contain demographic information such as, name, address, DOB, hospital number, admitted from e.g. home A/E or another hospital.<br>Soon after the patient returned home she realised that the book was picked up in error, but was aware she was due a visit from the community midwife the following day so would return it to her.<br>The book was returned to the midwife the following day, assurances were received from the patient that once they realised it was information relating to other patients and she did not inspect it any further. | Paper book containing a number of pages and information on labels are placed within the book, four to each side of paper. |
| IGI/11654 | Devon Doctors Ltd | 03-May-17 | 1 | Following a complaint from a patient that she had been assaulted by her partner, investigations have shown that a receptionist confirmed to the partner that the patient presented at our service. | Electronic data passed on verbally by a receptionist - that a patient had an interaction with our service. |
| IGI/11644 | LEEDS AND YORK PARTNERSHIP NHS | 30-May-17 | 2 letters | One form included name of other patient only, the other included forensic details (index offence, victim's name, and recent Safeguarding concerns). | Mental Health Act Section 17 Leave forms x 2 - detailed name of another service user and forensic |

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| | FOUNDATION TRUST | | | | data / safeguarding concerns. |
| IGI/11661 | Buckinghamshire Healthcare NHS Trust | 16-May-17 | 49 | The Trust recently changed temporary/Bank staffing provider.  Staff were informed of the change and were given the option to opt out of having their details included in the auto registration process.  Approx. 49 members of staff chose to opt out.  An individual who had opted out, contacted the temporary staffing office as they had received a letter from the new provider.  It transpired that the information of the 49 individuals who opted out was included in a spreadsheet to the new provider and downloaded to their secure shared area. The new provider has been asked to confirm that the 49 individual's details is no longer accessible to them and the information has not been uploaded to any of their systems. | Name, job role, Address, ESR Number, NI number, work email address, work area, staff group, job role, pay band, professional registration details, gender, date of birth |
| IGI/11604 | Bourn Hall Ltd | 03-May-17 | 392 email addresses |  An email was prepared and sent out with the title "Private and Confidential" from the email address <Redacted> The email was sent by a member of the clinic's Patient Services department. It was general in nature and referred to a consultation process regarding funding for IVF treatment which "will impact a number of couples from the Cambridge and Peterborough Area". The email sought online feedback from the recipients.<br><br>There were 392 addresses within the 'to' field. These addresses ought to have been hidden within the 'bcc' field, however the recipient addresses were mistakenly left visible when the email was sent. | The data relates to service user information. The information is limited only to email addresses, though some of those addresses identify the names of service users. The disclosure of sensitive information is because of the inference that an identifiable owner of a email address is a user of the Bourn Hall service. |

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| | | | | It is possible that a large number of the addresses (though not all) could be used to identify individuals by name. Where this is possible, this could also identify individuals to the other recipients as a service user or previous service user.<br><br>The Clinic has strong security safeguards in place to avoid such incidents. Staff receive mandatory training and regular awareness updates to ensure operational security when handling personal information. The sender of the email had recently completed a refresher data protection course. The Clinic has a strong background of data protection compliance, with this incident being its only ICO reportable data incident in its history.<br><br>No other information was disclosed – this incident was therefore limited to a specific category of information (email addresses) disclosed to a specific class of people (service users or previous service users). Significant containment efforts have been made which are detailed below to mitigate the effects of the breach and to limit the distress caused to individuals. | |
| IGI/11732 | PORTSMOUTH HOSPITALS NHS TRUST | 26-May-17 | 1 | Ultra-sonographer failed to follow processes put in place following previous incident. When maternity client sent out to walk she did not return her notes to her, and proceeded to scan another ladies. The second lady was then given the wrong notes to take home. Staff member did not follow process by having two sets of notes in the room and did not ask the client | Name<br>Date of Birth<br>NHS number<br>address<br>hospital number |

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| | | | | to identify herself when handing the notes over. Second client took notes home and was telephoned to request returning them.  Stated she had not looked in her folder and was not aware she had wrong notes. Notes did have name on outside cover, but the second client took them and put them in her plastic wallet without looking at them. | detailed medical/maternity notes |
| IGI/11581 | PENNINE CARE NHS FOUNDATION TRUST | 27-Jun-17 | 1 | The documents were put in the envelope and the address was hand written on. The wrong address was written (I.e. The word 'Lane' was used instead of 'Avenue' -everything else was correct). The letter was received at the wrong address - the recipient opened the letter, so they were able to contact the service and return it. | Correspondence including care plan |
| IGI/11742 | LINCOLNSHIRE PARTNERSHIP NHS FOUNDATION TRUST | 19-Jun-17 | not known | Both incidents of unauthorised access occurred on the same day at 2 separate inpatient units involving 2 different Inspectors and Advisors.  The records accessed by the unauthorised individuals related to patients currently resident on the wards and complete mental health records were available to be viewed through the clinical system.   Prior to the CQC visit a list of 31 CQC staff requiring access to clinical systems was supplied and these staff were provided with e-learning and a set of unique user names and passwords to enable system access. | Complete service user records inappropriately accessed at 2 inpatient sites |
| IGI/11579 | CORNWALL PARTNERSHIP NHS | 26-Jun-17 | 1 | Complaint letter received at Carew House in relation to a second incident where sensitive CAMHS information had been sent to Social Care Dorset Ltd (Private organisation). | Patient letter contains sensitive data regarding the individual's Child & Adolescent Mental Health Service involvement. |

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| | FOUNDATION TRUST | | | Complaint letter details concerns raised by Director of Social Care Dorset Ltd, as this is the second occurrence that a CAMHS letter has been sent to this organisation (previous incident 82188). Letter requires response to Social Care Dorset Ltd within 28 days and implies that the Information Commissioner's Office has been notified of the incident.<br><br>Patient letter contains sensitive data regarding the individual, there is also potentially sensitive data regarding other family members - however this information is not identifiable unless you are aware of family dynamics | There is also potentially sensitive data regarding other family members - however this information is not identifiable |
| IGI/11542 | Carehome Selection Ltd | 19-Apr-17 | 31 | A user of our CHS Track database, which is used to manage patient information from within a "discharge to assess" hospital setting, downloaded a patient situation report from the database to send to NHS staff within the hospital.<br><br>This is a routine daily occurrence and informs and updates NHS staff in relation to patient movements or intended movements from hospital into a discharge setting.<br><br>Unbeknown to her, the report downloaded the data for patients in a hospital other than the one requested. The cause of this has since been identified to be an issue with the database operating software.<br><br>Our user then sent the report suitably encrypted, internally within the hospital to the usual circulation list | The report contained the names of a patients and minor snippets of clinical information in some cases. |

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| | | | | of NHS Staff whereupon it was found to be the wrong data.<br><br>An investigation has revealed that the software that controls this process was deficient in that, in certain circumstances, it would not report to users if the operation was successful or otherwise.  In this case, it was not successful and presented the user with a hospital situation report for a different hospital.  We have taken steps now to ensure that this software inadequacy has been corrected and a similar situation cannot recur in the future.<br><br>Our user did not check the content of the report prior to sending it and we accept that she should have done and has been advised accordingly.<br><br>The recipients of the data have all been contacted and requested to delete the report and confirm that they have done so. | |
| IGI/11541 | AVON AND WILTSHIRE MENTAL HEALTH PARTNERSHIP NHS TRUST | 26-Apr-17 | 1 piece | A copy of a letter, previously sent to Person 1 in answer to a question he submitted at Board was re sent for information. It appears that the copy of the letter contained details of a subject access request for Person 2. | name |
| IGI/11552 | DORSET COUNTY HOSPITALS NHS | 03-May-17 | 1, 240 | Email was sent to all Foundation Trust Members, reminding them of an upcoming event, but email addresses were included in the 'To' field, rather than | Foundation Trust Member's email addresses |

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| | FOUNDATION TRUST | | | the 'BCC' field. Message was recalled, and recall was partially successful. Further email sent to all Members acknowledging the error, apologising and asking that the message be deleted and that nobody's email address be used. ICO reviewed the incident and took the decision that the incident does not meet the criteria for formal enforcement action. | |
| IGI/11536 | DARTFORD AND GRAVESHAM NHS TRUST | 07-Jun-17 | 14 | Handover sheet containing sensitive personal information taken home by ward staff and disposed of in their home rubbish.<br>Incident occurred in March and brought to the attention of Trust management later in March. Handover sheet details patient name, age, consultant, diagnosis, history, home/social status, mobility/OT/Physio referrals and plan of care/MRSA. Clear breach of Trust policy and procedures as staff should know to dispose of all unwanted confidential documentation in the confidential waste bins located on all wards. | Handover sheet details patient name, age, consultant, diagnosis, history, home/social status, mobility/OT/Physio referrals and plan of care/MRSA. |
| IGI/11521 | Owlthorpe Medical Centre (C88647) | 30-Jun-17 | 700 | Emailed over 700 patients to invite them to join our Patient participation group accidently put all email address in the "to" section instead of "BCC" section | Emailed over 700 patients to invite them to join our Patient participation group accidently put all email address in the "to" section instead of "CC" section |
| IGI/11514 | THE QUEEN ELIZABETH HOSPITAL KING'S LYNN NHS | 18-Apr-17 | 10 | Following the death of a patient, the family is in the process of raising a formal complaint. As part of this process they requested a copy of the patient's health records. The family met with the Trust and during the conversation the family raised concerns that the health | 1 haematology test report<br><br>Ward handover sheet: Hospital no., Admission date, Surname, Age, |

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| | FOUNDATION TRUST | | | records also held the test results of another patient and a ward handover sheet containing the details of 9 other patients. | Summaries of Diagnosis, Treatment, Plan from ward round, Pressure areas/Turning clock/Falls/Blue tray/Safeguarding/Allergies comments and Discharge plan |
| IGI/11505 | EAST LANCASHIRE HOSPITALS NHS TRUST | 18-May-17 | 1 A4 Sheet | Theatre list found in staff only car park by staff member and given to Senior Manager.  The Theatre list was picked up on the same day as it was printed.  The risk of a breach was minimal, in the opinion of the IG team, but reported to ICO as incident of this type has occurred before. | 4 patients very limited personal sensitive information. Name, DOB, Hospital Number, Patient Status (inpatient, day case), sex, Anesthetic, ward, type of Orthopaedic operation. |
| IGI/11487 | Forest Group Practice (D83062) | 23-Jun-17 | 1 | Army questionnaire completed about wrong patient with a very similar name to the correct patient.  Not picked up by GPR when completing or by Admin when sending.  Army sent report back when they identified it as the incorrect patient. | Medical history, discharge letters from hospital |
| IGI/11490 | Hertfordshire Community NHS Trust (RY4) | 23-Jun-17 | 5000 | Names, addresses & NHS numbers for 5000 patients transferring from HCT to West Essex were mistakenly sent in an insecure method i.e. from HCT email to Synertec email | Excel file |
| IGI/11519 | The AccEPT Clinic (University of Exeter) | 30-Jun-17 | 1 | A patient of the service - on their request - was sent a link to a secure, password protected institutional drop box folder via email. In the folder were several audio recordings of therapy sessions (the patient had | Audio-files of therapy sessions from one patient. |

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| | | | | preferred this to taking home physical copies of the sessions - listening to them was part of the treatment). The link to the folder, and password, were sent to the incorrect email address (human error). We do not yet know if the material was accessed by a third party (it has now been deleted and is not accessible) The error came to light when the patient reported that the link had not been received. The patient was informed of the error and wished to have confirmation, if possible, that the information had not been accessed by anyone.<br>At present we do not know whether this information has been accessed by any unauthorised third party, nor whether the information contains high risk confidential information. However, to err on the side of caution we are responding to this as a level 2 incident.: We have subsequently learned that some of the information relates to an ongoing court case. We have disclosed this to local safety systems reporting who will advise on whether the court system needs to be informed.<br>We still have no information as to whether the files concerned were in fact downloaded whilst available, but we are following this up actively to see if this information is available. | |
| IGI/11603 | Mears Care Limited (part of Mears Group PLC) | 03-May-17 | 2 | The Branch emailed the Service User's daughter (who receives their rota on their behalf) their intended rota attached as a PDF, and copied in the Quality and Risk Assurance Officer. This was done by printing, scanning, copying from a folder and attaching to the email – the branch was unaware that rotas could be | Service User sensitive personal information, including name, address, DOB, medical circumstances, care needs, disability, and |

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| | | | | sent directly from the rostering system.<br><br>The Quality and Risk Assurance Officer checked the PDF for quality purposes to check that there were no issues. On review they realised that the attachments was a 19-page Care Needs and Risk Assessment document relating to another Service User. | health related information.<br><br>The Service User's Next of Kin asked to be sent their mother's rota based. The branch called the Service User's daughter straight away to apologise and they confirmed they will delete the data, and there is no evidence of any further harm. The branch also contacted the affected subject's Next of Kin who was satisfied with how the incident has been handled despite the initial error being made. |
| IGI/10445 | BARNET, ENFIELD AND HARINGEY MENTAL HEALTH NHS TRUST | 05-Apr-17 | 851 | The Trust received an alert from the Care Quality Commission that patient identifiable information had been sent to 'Quality Health'  by the Trust in error. (Quality Health work for NHS patients in all parts of the UK), advised the CQC that the Trust had sent them the required information, but the report contained an additional tab that included patient identifiable information.  The patient identifiable information consisted of names, addresses, electronic record number, CCG code, CPA status and year of birth. | Patient demographic information |
| IGI/11582 | FRIMLEY HEALTH NHS | 04-May-17 | 102 | A spread sheet containing 102 patients was accidently emailed outside of the Trust network. The report that | test, speciality, consultant surname, weeks, hospital |

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| | FOUNDATION TRUST | | | was sent is routinely sent internally in the department for validation of waiting times, there is no need to send out externally. The external member of staff was picked up as a previous email contact as the first name was identical to the internal member of staff it needed to go to. | number, surname, forename, start date, expire admittance, ward |
| IGI/11586 | SOUTH WEST YORKSHIRE PARTNERSHIP FOUNDATION NHS TRUST | 24-Apr-17 | 64 | A locum doctor was scheduled to work in the Trust for six days but, due to the expense involved, the consultant felt attending training that would have resulted in system access being granted, was not a cost-effective use of his time so shared her login details to allow him to work. 15 forms were completed after accessing patient information and 49 sets of results were printed for sending onto GPs. | Electronic patient records initially followed by paper forms and print outs |
| IGI/11496 | Manor Park Medical Centre (G81049) | 27-Jun-17 | 48 | During internal audit work in the practice, a nurse accidentally copied an email containing 48 patients' name, DOB, NHS number and address to someone in NHS England.  The email made it plain these patients were all diabetic and either on insulin or about to start it.  This occurred due to momentary inattention when selecting addresses to other members of the practice. The original email and the accidental recipient were both *@nhs.net email addresses.  The email was not encrypted.  This breached the practice's Information Governance Policy.<br><br>All patients were identified, and most were spoken to by phone the following day by the IG lead for the practice.  Those who we could not be contacted by the next day were written to. | Name, Date of birth, postal address, NHS number. Though not specifically listed against each patient, the fact of diabetes and insulin treatment was implicit given the content of the email. |

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| | | | | We emailed the NHS England recipient to ask for the email to be deleted, preferably unread, but received no reply. We attempted to find other contact details for the person but with no luck. To date we have had no reply.<br><br>The nurse concerned has been disciplined for gross misconduct.<br><br>Today I will be writing to patients to let them know the outcome of the process. | |
| IGI/10405 | NHS Kingston CCG | 14-Jun-17 | 102 | A list of costs for interpretation services were received by finance for billing purposes from Royal Borough of Kingston. Previously this list contained details of the location where the service was provided (e.g. GP Practice) but no client details. However, in this instance the pdf file also included the name of the client in the "location" field. The management accountant who received this file sent the file back to the sender via an unsecure route before realising that there were client names within it. | Person's name and language |
| IGI/11527 | The Misbourne Surgery (K82051) | 09-May-17 | 14 | During a consultation the nurse gave out some leaflets to the patient regarding travel vaccine advice. Unfortunately, she also picked up a printout that she had on her desk showing details of her clinic list that morning. This included the patient name and reason for appointment.<br><br>We print out the next day's clinic lists at the end of the | The printed list of names showed the appointment time and reason for attendance. |

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| | | | | day - this is in case of computer problems/power failure overnight.  Unfortunately, the nurse had this on her desk in the morning and it appears she picked it up along with the leaflets she had printed for the patient and handed it all to the patient.<br><br>The incident was reported to the practice by the patient's mother. | |
| IGI/11543 | Central London Community Healthcare NHS Trust | 02-May-17 | 209 | An email was sent to an employee that had an attachment relating to 209 employees.<br><br>The attachment was a mail merge letter template relating to the recovery of an over payment due to issues with the way the Allocate system was processed over the Christmas period.<br><br>The attachment contained the following information for each employee:<br><br>• Their Name<br>• Their postal address as held on ESR<br>• The amount of over payment to be recovered | • Name<br>• Address<br>• The amount of over payment to be recovered |
| IGI/10387 | SALISBURY NHS FOUNDATION TRUST | 12-Jun-17 | 33 | Excess baggage left for destruction by airport staff containing patient information and NHS property. | This incident has been passed to NHS Protect (Fraud) for further investigation |
| IGI/9383 | Beacon Medical Practice (C83019) | 10-Jun-17 | 1 | One of our GP's personal pension data was shared with another practice by Capita. It was emailed | All pension data including figures relating to an individual GP including |

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| | | | | including full accounts and with the header GMS3 Form. | personal Identifiable details |
| IGI/10404 | UNITED LINCOLNSHIRE HOSPITALS NHS TRUST | 03-May-17 | 21 | Member of public visiting her mother on a ward was speaking to a member who said she would give her number to contact her. The member of staff picked up a piece of paper from a table in the middle of the bay and wrote her number giving it to the visitor.<br>After leaving the ward the visitor noticed the back of the A4 sheet had a full ward list printed from Medway (includes 21 full patient names, DOB, NHS number, hospital number, consultant, date of admission, gender, bed number).<br><br>The visitor was a member of staff within the Trust and highlighted this to the Information Security team. | 21 full patient names, DOB, NHS number, hospital number, consultant, date of admission, gender, bed number |
| IGI/9368 | CHAS A BLATCHFORD & SONS LTD | 13-Apr-17 | 167 | Blatchford admin was approached by an NHS Luton manager for patient information regarding the limited orthotic practitioner clinic as a number of patients were set up on the incorrect clinic list. Admin pulled this information from the Rehabilitation Management System (RMS) and showed the NHS Member the patient information on the desktop in an Excel spread sheet and the NHS Member requested that this be passed to them. The admin person then forwarded this to the persons NHS account from the Blatchford account without removing/limiting the patient details and without encryption. The NHS member then sent this email to the Blatchford IT Service Desk with a request that all the patients be exported to the correct clinic. This was how the incident was identified. | NHS Patient personal data |

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| | | | | The excel spreadsheet identified 167 patients including full names, telephone numbers, home addresses, NHS number, mobile numbers, RMS number, DOB, age, hospital number.  The information included some minors. | |
| IGI/10390 | Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust | 17-May-17 | 33 patients | The notebook contained the following information for 33 patients:  Full name, address, date of birth, NHS number, medical details and consultation notes. | NHS patient data |
| IGI/10398 | PENNINE CARE NHS FOUNDATION TRUST | 12-Jun-17 | 1 | A letter was sent to a staff member. The letter requested the checking of enclosed notes taken at a meeting to discuss a conduct concern. The enclosed notes detailed conversations that took place at the meeting which took place. The letter was incorrectly addressed to house number 7 rather than to 17 (unknown at the time)<br>An HR Assistant, received a call from the occupant of house number 7 reporting that she had received a letter in error. The caller reported not knowing the intended recipient.<br>HR Assistant requested that the recipient return the letter to sender. HR Assistant did not indicate the intended address to the recipient.<br>The Staff member is currently on Annual Leave and is outside of the UK and as such is yet to be informed. | A letter detailing discussion notes of conduct with a member of staff |
| IGI/9369 | PENNINE CARE NHS FOUNDATION TRUST | 07-Jun-17 | 1 | A member of staff from AL nursing home attended the ward. he stated he had come to assess a client for his suitability to move to that premises. He requested to see the patients nursing and medical notes and medicine Kardex. He was supplied with these and | Client care records |

| ID | Organisation Name | Date of Closure | Volume | Details of Incident | Data |
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| | | | | completed his assessment by having a brief talk with the patient. On completion of this conversation he left the ward. After a conversation with a member of the mdt it transpired that the family had not wished-for AL nursing home to assess and had not requested they do this. | |
| IGI/11493 | Care Plus Group | 26-Jun-17 | 1 | Daughter of the patient received a telephone call on her landline. She answered the phone and said "hello". The person on the other end of the phone did not introduce herself or ask whom she was speaking to and proceeded to say "You need to go and see this patient, she is one of your patients and she is end of life. Her name is <Redacted>, I have just been to see her, and you need to visit her".  The person on the other end of the phone then stopped talking for a moment and the patient's daughter said, " I think there's a problem here". The person on the phone then went quiet and did not say much else.   The patient's daughter believed that the Community Nurse had intended to contact the patients GP and not herself.  The patient's daughter was unaware that her mother was "end of life" at this time, so receiving this news was very upsetting for her, and for her to find out this has caused a lot of distress. | Staff member speaking to daughter on telephone without confirming who they were speaking too |
| IGI/10449 | NORFOLK AND NORWICH UNIVERSITY HOSPITALS NHS FOUNDATION TRUST | 16-May-17 | 3 | Three (3) A&E discharge letters were sent to a member of the public home address instead of the Health Visiting Team. The member of the public has called the Trust to advise about this incident. The letters contained demographics of the three paediatric patients with sensitive information such as suspected | NHS patient data |

| ID | Organisation Name | Date of Closure | Volume | Details of Incident | Data |
|----|-------------------|-----------------|--------|---------------------|------|
|    |                   |                 |        | non-acute safeguarding issues about two of three children, which the parents may not be aware of. |      |

# Appendix A

# Incidents closed using the 'auto closure[4]' facility 1st. April to 30th. June 2017

| ID | Organisation Name | Date of Closure | Volume | Details of Incident | Data |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IGI/10432 | Datchet Health Centre (K81021) | 19-Jun-17 | 1 person affected | I was dealing with the patient in an on-going complaint. He had requested a summary (2 page) copy of his records. I was mindful of the time scales and wanted to send the records to him as soon as possible and instead of following the correct process I copied and attached them to the email. | Name, DOB, NHS number, address. Dates of active problems, inactive problem, minor problems, past problems. No in-depth information on there |
| IGI/9366 | PENNINE CARE NHS FOUNDATION TRUST | 06-Apr-17 | 1 | Received a phone call from a member of the public regarding him receiving post on 2 occasions that were not meant for him. The post contained details of health assessments on Looked after children. The gentleman reported he was aware that is was illegal to open mail that was not intended for you so therefore was not aware of the contents. On the second occasion however, he took the | Health assessments on Looked After Children |

[4] The organisation is notified by email 10 days in advance giving them time to update or close the incident before the auto closure occurs. If the organisation updates the record, it will not be auto closed. The organisation will also receive an email notification within 24 hours after auto closure, and if necessary can reopen the incident.

| ID | Organisation Name | Date of Closure | Volume | Details of Incident | Data |
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| | | | | unopened letter to Sale Library and was advised it would be returned to the sender, several days later he received the same letter back in a different envelope. On this occasion he opened the letter and removed the covering letter containing our contact detail and rang the department | |
| IGI/11580 | FRIMLEY HEALTH NHS FOUNDATION TRUST | 04-May-17 | 94 | Spread sheet containing patient identifiable information was sent through to two local CCGs and the Ambulance Trust. It was the first time that the report had been sent and had been requested by the CCG to audit the activity of an interim service that started in January was running correctly and that the right patients were being sent to the right provider by the Ambulance service.<br><br>The information that was sent was hospital number, attendance number, date of arrival, patients name, postcode prefix, presenting complaint, diagnosis, discharge destination, mode of arrival, CCG provider<br><br>The information was sent from the | The information that was sent was hospital number, attendance number, date of arrival, patients name, postcode prefix, presenting complaint, diagnosis, discharge destination, mode of arrival, CCG provider |

| ID | Organisation Name | Date of Closure | Volume | Details of Incident | Data |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | Trust provider email account externally outside of the organisation to the Ambulance Trust, three CCGs and two internal members of staff. There are 4 people that have received the information via insecure means. Only the postcode prefix should have been sent with no other identifiable information and should have only been sent to the Ambulance Trust from nhs.net to nhs.net. The Ambulance Trust would have already held the information for 80 of the patients as they would have transported them to the hospital.<br><br>The member of staff is aware that it should have gone from nhs.net to another nhs.net account. | |
| IGI/9352 | MEDWAY NHS FOUNDATION TRUST | 03-Apr-17 | 197 | The Medway Foundation NHS Trust IG Manager was made aware of a potential data breach by Kent Community Healthcare Trust. At that time the granularity of the data of volume of patients was not known. The breach was stated to be in the form of backing data for payment for sexual health services provided by KCHT to Medway | Full data fields captured below - not all are personal data to the patient however the totality of the data in relation to it supporting sexual health services deems it to be sensitive.<br><br>Month<br>Source<br>CCG |

| ID | Organisation Name | Date of Closure | Volume | Details of Incident | Data |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | service users. Patient identifiable data should not have been issued - anonymised data should have been sent. Data was transmitted securely between two NHS.net email accounts.<br><br>The volume of patients was confirmed as 2440 and the data granularity confirmed as including the patient name / sex/ DoB / Hops no / NHS no / and post code.<br><br>Initial local investigation suggests that the team involved had a similar incident (but without patient name / sex or DoB) a few months prior which did not reach a SIRI level.<br><br>IG Manager to continue investigation. | Patient_Type_Code<br>Specialty<br>Clinician<br>GP code<br>Location code<br>Location<br>Name<br>Sex<br>Date_Of_Birth<br>Hosp no<br>NHS Number<br>Post code<br>Receive Date<br>Time<br>Resulted<br>Specimen No<br>specimen Type<br>Test code<br>Order<br>Pathology<br>Activity<br>Cost<br>String<br>GL Code<br>Invoice no<br>Provider link<br>A/C No |
| IGI/11544 | HARROGATE AND DISTRICT NHS | 27-Jun-17 | 309 during 3 months that we have looked at | When looking into another incident, which we did not find anything inappropriate, we noticed some unusual activity by another staff | NHS number, hospital number, patients' name, address, date of birth, GP, appointment dates, medical specialities of appointment, |

| ID | Organisation Name | Date of Closure | Volume | Details of Incident | Data |
|----|-------------------|-----------------|--------|---------------------|------|
| | FOUNDATION TRUST | | | member.<br><br>When we extended the search, and looked at the last 3 months we found a possible 309 searches on the patient administration system that were not appropriate, 174 of these searched resulted in the induvial looking at their patient activity summary, 25 resulted in looking at previous addresses, 7 resulted in looking at alias names and 4 resulted in looking at locations of case notes.<br><br>A number of the patients were previous and current members of staff and some of their families.<br><br>The patient activity summary which includes a patient's name, address, unit number, NHS number, GP, date of birth, risk flags, outpatient appointment dates and speciality and consultant, admission dates and speciality and consultant, A&E dates and attendance type. When searching on the administration system the individual had access to the patient's telephone numbers and next of kin details. | admission dates, medical specialities of admission dates, ED attendance dates, some limited clinical information about the appointment type or ED attendance type.<br><br>Accessed system through own log in and password. |

| ID | Organisation Name | Date of Closure | Volume | Details of Incident | Data |
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| | | | | The individual has been suspended and disciplinary process has begun.<br><br>Confirmed individual is up-to-date with Information Governance Training.<br><br>When questioned, the individual has admitted to looking at patient activity summaries, previous addresses and alias names of patients inappropriately and that this has been going on for a number of years. The individual denied looking at the paper records following looking where they were located.<br><br>This investigation is still underway at this time. | |
| IGI/11485 | Kent Community Health NHS Foundation Trust | 23-Jun-17 | 4 | Information regarding domestic abuse was attached to a text appointment reminder.  The information should not have been sent to the person to whom it went. | Personal data and Sensitive personal data |
| IGI/11481 | Christmas Maltings Surgery (D83021) | 23-Jun-17 | 95 | Doctor visited a patient at home. She took with her hospital letters for the patient.  Unfortunately, when | List of patient's name, DOB, diagnosis, severity, treatment and |

| ID | Organisation Name | Date of Closure | Volume | Details of Incident | Data |
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| | | | | gathering the letters to take with her she accidentally picked up the list for a recent palliative care meeting.  On this list was confidential patient information - name, DOB, diagnosis, treatment, severity and prognosis. The patient contacted the doctor and the information was retrieved, A letter of apology has been seen to all patients involved.  The incident was discussed with the GP partners and practice managers at a significant event meeting. | prognosis which was required for recent palliative care meeting. |
| IGI/9346 | Peacocks Medical Group Ltd | 01-Jun-17 | 127 | A member of our clinical team who delivers orthotic clinics in hospitals had parked his car at Great Ormond Street hospital to visit his daughter. In his car was: a personal laptop, his Clinic bag which contained the footwear and casts of patients he had seen in his previous clinics, his OthoPro tablet which he places his orders back to head office on and an unencrypted USB stick which held the clinical notes of the patients he had seen. This had the records of 127 individuals. When he returned to his car, his windows had been broken and everything, including | The stolen USB Stick had patient demographic and clinical data on it. |

| ID | Organisation Name | Date of Closure | Volume | Details of Incident | Data |
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| | | | | the USB stick had been stolen from his car. | |
| IGI/9362 | Central London Community Healthcare NHS Trust | 02-May-17 | 100 | Approximately 31 Speech & Language Therapy and District Nursing boxed case files and staff records have been subject to flood damage.  These files were to be catalogued discharges and staff files, which were prepared and boxed and placed on the floor in a locked room awaiting archiving. Collection for archiving was due to proceed in late February. | District Nursing and Speech & Language records |
| IGI/9336 | THE WALTON CENTRE NHS FOUNDATION TRUST | 03-Jun-17 | 32 | Datix incident report received over the weekend. Picked up by the IG team on the Monday for investigation. Patient has advised the Ward Manager that he has read the handover sheets. Total of 32 patients affected. Bays redacted had patient initials. Patient returned handover notes after approximately 45 minutes. Ward Manager was advised, and incident reported. Full investigation is being carried out and the outcome to be reported to the board. | Printed ward handover which included - Ward name, room/bay number, initials of patient, (9 patients had hand written names, age of patient, consultant, date of admission, allergy/infection status, safeguarding DOLS, social issues, diagnosis, past medical history some of which was sensitive. |

| ID | Organisation Name | Date of Closure | Volume | Details of Incident | Data |
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| IGI/9364 | ROYAL FREE LONDON NHS FOUNDATION TRUST | 05-Jun-17 | 50 | Community antenatal clinic diary not accounted for and not seen for s number of days. The diary contained the following information: name, MRN, telephone number, gestation, date and time of clinic attendances but no other clinical detail. The diary was last seen in the midwife's tray. The door to this office is locked when the office is unattended. The room can only be accessed by staff with a key lock code. | The diary contained the following information: name, MRN (hospital number not NHS number), telephone number, gestation, date and time of clinic attendances but no other clinical detail. |
| IGI/9342 | HSR and Management, School of Health Sciences, City University, London | 31-May-17 | 151+ | During a desk reallocation exercise, paper copies of Maternal Transfer Summary records were found in an unlocked drawer.  These included full research subject details including elements of medical history and details of the subject's ongoing pregnancy.  The files were dated around 2011 and covered 300+ subjects.

Additionally, a single full NHS patient medical record was found in the same drawer.  This contained the full medical history of the subject along with scans etc. | 150+ Printed patient records detailing care received regarding maternity
1 Full NHS patient record |

| ID | Organisation Name | Date of Closure | Volume | Details of Incident | Data |
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| IGI/9332 | KING'S COLLEGE HOSPITAL NHS FOUNDATION TRUST | 22-May-17 | estimated 20 | A pile of patient notes blew out of an ED Consultant's office window. Window was open due to office being very hot.  When the office door was opened, a gust of wind took a pile of ED casualty cards (estimated 20 casualty cards which will have name, dob, and clinical details), which were sitting under the windowsill, out of the window. This took place during storm Doris. We are uncertain of whose notes they were or how many sets. Multiple searches were made on the hospital grounds and the surrounding area (both sides of Denmark Hill) until darkness. Some notes were recovered both on the day and the following day, but we cannot be certain whether all were found. | estimated 20 casualty cards which will have name, dob, and clinical details |
| IGI/9371 | Sandy Lane Surgery (P81076) | 07-Jun-17 | 2 | GP's travel case stolen whilst away for the weekend in London. Case contained practice draft accounts and a finance file which was likely to contain staff names and salary details | Spread-sheet would have contained staff name, role, hours, hourly rate and annual salary. Draft partnership account would have contained practice income and expenditure, partners name |
| IGI/8311 | NHS Nene CCG | 26-May-17 | 30 | PID attachment received by email from provider -email and attachment forwarded as received. | Patient names and incident type |

| ID | Organisation Name | Date of Closure | Volume | Details of Incident | Data |
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| | | | | Incident reports received from provider on a multi attachment email sent from and to non NHSmail accounts<br><br>Reports should have been anonymised as CCG policy<br>One of the incident reports contained names of approx. 30 patients together with the incident detail<br>Email forwarded as received to two further internal recipients | |
| IGI/9377 | St Andrew's Healthcare (Original code of NTY85) | 09-Jun-17 | 2 | CPA report and minutes from the meeting copied to incorrect commissioner. Under the correct commissioners contact details there was a comment stating to copy correspondence to another professional, who it transpires had previous involvement with the patient. We were then informed that that individual should not have been sent that documentation. The correspondence was sent via NHS mail to another NHS email address and was not password protected. | CPA report<br>Minutes from CPA meeting |

| ID | Organisation Name | Date of Closure | Volume | Details of Incident | Data |
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| IGI/9330 | DARTFORD AND GRAVESHAM NHS TRUST | 07-Jun-17 | 28 | A member of staff (sender) responding to an email request from another member of staff (recipient) replied by attaching a spreadsheet relating to gynaecology incident reporting.<br><br>The spreadsheet contained a number of tabs, mostly containing graphs and statistical data but one tab detailed the recorded incidents between November 2015 and January 2016.<br><br>It was only after the email was sent that the sender realised that the recipient was using their personal yahoo email for Trust business and the spreadsheet had not been password protected as the sender believed the recipient to be using NHSmail. | NHS patient data |
| IGI/8307 | GEORGE ELIOT HOSPITAL NHS TRUST | 22-May-17 | 1 sheet | Doctors printed handover sheet out and was later found by a member of the public in the ladies' toilets in maternity reception - issue of confidentiality breach as containing personal sensitive information | Name, Date of Birth and Hospital number, diagnosis and to do list. |

| ID | Organisation Name | Date of Closure | Volume | Details of Incident | Data |
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| IGI/8305 | MERSEY CARE NHS FOUNDATION TRUST | 05-Jun-17 | 3 pages | Letter sent to incorrect home address. Letter contained information regarding complaint investigation with named members of staff addressed to Mothers old address in respect of her son. | Letter sent to incorrect home address. Letter contained information regarding complaint investigation with named members of staff addressed to Mothers old address in respect of her son. The letter did not contain full clinical information in respect of the patient only incident investigation information. |
| IGI/8312 | HCA HEALTHCARE UK | 04-May-17 | 25 | Staff member sent an email to a patient, with several attachments, one of which was a "Patient Overview" list containing other patient's information such as name, age, diagnosis. The incident was reported by the risk manager of the facility on Datix. IG manager noted after contacting the staff member, head of governance, risk manager and director of the service concerned to gain further information and the following was noted: Potential patient that was thinking of using the service required more information about the service. Staff member attached information leaflet but also details of 25 patients (name, age, diagnosis and consultant detail) that attend the | Patient data, i.e. Name, age, date of birth, diagnosis and consultant details. |

| ID | Organisation Name | Date of Closure | Volume | Details of Incident | Data |
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| | | | | service. Patient then emailed back the staff of the error that had occurred. Staff member, as well as the Director apologised to the patient that received this information in error. Head of Governance of the facility and Head of Clinical Services have investigated and will put in place shared learning arising from this incident. Also, as part of the IG corporate induction further emphasis will be placed of ensuring that staff are more careful with the contents of the attachments before sending out an email. | |
| IGI/9331 | Solent NHS Trust | 29-May-17 | 1 | Initial investigations show that, a safeguarding referral form for Patient A was left in another patient B's home. Patient A's form had been printed and taken to Patient B's home so an inexperienced staff member (inexperienced based on the fact they had not completed one of these forms before) could use it as a template to complete the Safeguarding Form for Patient B. It was inadvertently left in Patient B's home in error | Safeguarding referral form |

| ID | Organisation Name | Date of Closure | Volume | Details of Incident | Data |
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| IGI/8273 | NHS England | 22-May-17 | 1 | A document was uploaded to the NHS England website in error, this was a summary of pharmacy alerts that had occurred during a month period. The document contained the personal and sensitive data of a patient. As the document was uploaded to the external facing NHS England website this allowed it to be searchable via Google. The document was supposed to be on the internal network only | Name<br>DOB<br>Address<br>Clinical data<br>Personal Sensitive Data |
| IGI/9373 | 41 Russell Street Surgery (K81081) | 07-Jun-17 | 120 | Email sent to redacted at Berks East CCG with a spreadsheet attachment that contained patient identifiable data. The spreadsheet contained 120 patient's details including full name, age, date of birth, gender, ethnic origin.<br><br>The reason this is an issue is that the CCG is not allowed to receive patient information unless it is in the patient's best interest for example safeguarding or if the patient has provided consent to share their details with the CCG as per clinical concerns | The spreadsheet contained 120 patient's details including full name, age, date of birth, gender, ethnic origin. |
| IGI/9335 | Solihull Metropolitan Borough Council | 22-May-17 | 217 | Service user details such as name, address, telephone number, date of | Service user details such as name, address, telephone number, date of |

| ID | Organisation Name | Date of Closure | Volume | Details of Incident | Data |
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| | | | | birth and gender plus contact details of professional's associated with the service user. Also details of next of kin or other key contacts for the service user and their relationship to them.<br>Keycodes to entry doors for 37 properties also stolen. | birth and gender plus contact details of professional's associated with the service user. Also details of next of kin or other key contacts for the service user and their relationship to them. Keycodes to entry doors for 35 properties also stolen. |
| IGI/8255 | THE WALTON CENTRE NHS FOUNDATION TRUST | 30-May-17 | 5 | Patients relative advised whilst she was in the day room on redacted Ward she found a copy of the nursing handover notes. This sheet contained details of 5 patients one of which was her own relative. Details included Ward name, room/bay number, initials of patient, age of patient, consultant, date of admission, high risks, allergy/infection status, safeguarding DOLS, social issues, diagnosis, past medical history, plan of care, therapy discharge plan.<br>Patient relative kept the sheet in her possession overnight and informed the ward manager the following day. | NHS Patient Details contained within a nursing handover document |
| IGI/8259 | MAIDSTONE AND TUNBRIDGE WELLS NHS TRUST | 13-Apr-17 | 3 | A local resident found a quantity of waste, two items of which contained a patient name and date | Name x 3<br>Date of Birth x 3<br>Hospital Number x 1 |

| ID | Organisation Name | Date of Closure | Volume | Details of Incident | Data |
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| | | | | of birth, another item contained the patient name, date of birth and hospital number on a public road. The resident searched a nearby waste bin and located other waste that contained no person identifiable information but which in likelihood came from the Trust. | |
| IGI/10423 | SUSSEX PARTNERSHIP NHS FOUNDATION TRUST | 15-Jun-17 | 52 | The worker involved reported that on arriving at Amberstone Hospital she went to unpack her laptop and the AOT weekend /operational case from her car and both had been stolen. The items had been locked in the car out of sight. The member of staff searched her whole car and asked her colleague to also check. When it was clear the items were missing she reported the theft to the Police and informed her line manager.<br><br>The following day the police attended Amberstone and took a full statement. | 2 pallaperidone injections<br>Team diary<br>Team message book<br>Weekly planner for visits with clients' names<br>Team's injection prescription cards<br>Medication recording folder<br>Trust laptop and case<br>Personal paperwork |
| IGI/8254 | SOUTH TYNESIDE FOUNDATION NHS TRUST | 18-May-17 | 16 | Detail – Junior Doctor left a bag containing patient identifiable information in his car overnight outside his home. During the night the car was broken into and the | Ward list relating to 15 named patients. The ward list contained the following information:<br><br>• bay, bed |

| ID | Organisation Name | Date of Closure | Volume | Details of Incident | Data |
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| | | | | bag stolen. The bag contained a Ward list relating to 15 named patients. The ward list contained the following information:<br><br>• bay, bed<br>• patients name<br>• reason for admission<br>• background including PMH<br>• treatment<br>• medical needs that day<br>• bloods/ TTO<br><br>The list did not identify the Ward or the Hospital, but did identify the responsible Consultant. A search on the Internet would link this consultant to South Tyneside NHS Foundation Trust.<br><br>In addition to this, the bag contained an A& E Casualty card and police report relating to a 16-year-old boy who attended the hospital following an assault. The A& E Card contains identifiable and clinical information relating to the child. | • patients name<br>• reason for admission<br>• background including PMH<br>• treatment<br>• medical needs that day<br>• bloods/ TTO<br><br>The A & E card would contain patient demographics, including next of kin and details of immediate treatment and investigations. |
| IGI/8228 | Solent NHS Trust | 15-May-17 | 2 | When releasing records of two children, as part of a Data Subject Access Request, to the children's | The information disclosed was the children's and Foster Parent's address (which is known to the birth |

| ID | Organisation Name | Date of Closure | Volume | Details of Incident | Data |
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| | | | | birth parents (who have joint Parental Responsibility with the Local Authority), some redacted information was not appropriately redacted and when held up to the light, the text below could be seen. The information disclosed was the children's and Foster Parent's address (which is known to the birth parents) and the Foster Parent's contact details. Also disclosed (unredacted) was the new surname of another child who has been adopted (no other demographics were released). | parents) and the Foster Parent's contact details. Also disclosed (unredacted) was the new surname of another child who has been adopted (no other demographics were released). |
| IGI/8236 | SANDWELL AND WEST BIRMINGHAM HOSPITALS NHS TRUST | 17-May-17 | 2000+ | A member of the public contacted the hospital to notify that he had discovered a carrier bag containing documents relating to hospital patients under a hedge in a residential garden he was gardening. The bag was collected immediately and was found to contain a variety of records including:<br>• recent examination results sheets for approximately 90 paediatric patients with patient demographic details and ethnicity;<br>• clinic lists of patients (approx. 2000) including patient names and | SUMMARY: Mostly paper records. 1 CD containing ED hospital notes for 8 individual patients.<br>DETAIL:<br>• recent examination results sheets for approximately 90 paediatric patients with patient demographic details and ethnicity;<br>• clinic lists of patients (approx. 2000) including patient names and hospital information some with contact numbers,<br>• an unencrypted cd with 8 scanned patient ED and admission and discharge hospital notes which includes  some detailed and |

| ID | Organisation Name | Date of Closure | Volume | Details of Incident | Data |
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| | | | | hospital information some with contact numbers,<br>• an unencrypted cd with 8 PDFs of scanned patient ED and admission and discharge hospital notes in. | sensitive information such as religion, ethnicity;<br>• mixture of various other information including internal hospital letters, patient and GP letters (13 patients approx.), printed patient lists from patient system CDA (500+), a patient cardiac recorder consent form, personal personnel information about the consultant themselves and a few dozen corporate documents (non-patient non-confidential). |
| IGI/9353 | SURREY AND BORDERS PARTNERSHIP NHS FOUNDATION TRUST | 03-Apr-17 | 331 | An email containing personal identifiable data was sent to two members of staff from Guildford and Waverly CCG (GWCCG) information account (NHSmail) using a Trust NHSmail address.<br><br>Two sets of monthly data (December 2016 and January 2017) in Excel format were attached, which were not password protected. Within each file, tabbed data included patient information (Children and Young People) with NHS numbers shown, patient information and some NHS numbers had full names alongside. These relate to 263 people who | Two sets of monthly data (December 2016 and January 2017) in Excel format were attached, which were not password protected. Within each file, tabbed data included patient information (Children and Young People) with NHS numbers shown, patient information and some NHS numbers had full names alongside.   In total there were 15 unique names and 11 were duplicates  In total there were 305 NHS numbers and 42 were duplicates. the 26 names were aligned to the 305 NHS numbers. therefore, there were 331 PID within the documents |

| ID | Organisation Name | Date of Closure | Volume | Details of Incident | Data |
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| | | | | use our services. <br><br> This information was then circulated to the members of the Clinical Quality Review Meeting who manage our contract. <br><br> At the Clinical Quality Review meeting held with members of Surrey County Council, Guildford and Waverly CCG and Trust staff the error was found and advice given on addressing the IG breach. The SABP Contracts Manager was allocated to take the lead. <br> An email was sent by SABP to GWCCG, requesting recipients were contacted to delete the report and actions undertaken were confirmed. This email was sent by GWCCG. <br><br> An email was issued to recipients apologising for the breach, which highlighted the incident was being assessed and that it may be reported. | |
| IGI/8167 | ROYAL CORNWALL HOSPITALS NHS TRUST | 06-May-17 | 18 RECORDS | The Child Therapies Lead sent a dashboard (created by another staff member) of developmental Co-ordination Disorder information to | Local identifier, NHS No, Surname, Forename, Complication, Severity and clinical notation of 18 children. |

| ID | Organisation Name | Date of Closure | Volume | Details of Incident | Data |
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| | | | | the local Commissioner and accidentally to the local Community Trust. The Dashboard was only intended to contain statistical information (not Personal Information), however there was a hidden tab which had been hidden by the creator of the Dashboard who was not aware that this was to be forwarded externally. The Therapies Lead is not an advanced IT practitioner and was not aware that there was or could be a hidden tab.<br><br>The local Commissioners identified the tab when they attempted to download it.<br><br>The tab Contained, Local identifier, NHS No, Surname, Forename, Complication, Severity and clinical notation.<br><br>As soon as the error was identified the Dashboard was deleted and the recipient immediately informed our Trust. | |

| ID | Organisation Name | Date of Closure | Volume | Details of Incident | Data |
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| IGI/8193 | St Andrew's Healthcare (Original code of NTY85) | 10-May-17 | 1 | Incorrect document was uploaded wrongly on local system by staff member 'A'. - patients care plan When that staff member was on leave staff member 'B' emailed out the pack for the meeting the next day without checking it, to the external Community Treatment Review team. This document contained full name, date of birth and NHS number. and information relating to general care, but no sensitive personal data. The following day when the pack was handed to the member of staff the mistake was identified. | This document contained full name, date of birth and NHS number. and information relating to general care, but no sensitive personal data. |
| IGI/8142 | Dr J A Tabner's Practice (B87029) | 01-May-17 | Not known | Current cleaner was off, so our cleaning service providers (external firm) brought in a new cleaner to cover, the receptionist realised that the confidential waste bin on reception was empty and questioned why, with the Practice Manager.

PM and receptionist realised that the new cleaner had emptied the bin for confidential waste, which was labelled 'Shredding' into the external recycling bin which is outside in the bin area in the car | NHS patient data |

| ID | Organisation Name | Date of Closure | Volume | Details of Incident | Data |
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| | | | | park.<br><br>The PM, staff and cleaners went out and emptied the bin, took out the papers and disposed of them securely within the practice. Prescription counterfoils and pathology results, which contain patient identifiable information were securely disposed of.<br>Currently the practice has a contract with an accredited firm who provide a locked console for all confidential waste, which is collected monthly and a confidential waste transfer note is left with the practice. The bin which was emptied is used next to the desk and the papers are then normally transferred to the locked console daily. | |
| IGI/11703 | MEDWAY NHS FOUNDATION TRUST | 26-May-17 | 1 | A member of the public wrote to the Trust Caldicott Guardian alleging that they had received an anonymous threatening phone call, which they believed had been made by a member of staff from within the Trust. They further alleged that their contact details had been obtained by the staff member (or a friend of the staff | the data obtained was the complainants personal contact details. |

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| | | | | member who also worked at the Trust) by inappropriately accessing their medical records. | |
| IGI/8180 | NHS Oldham CCG | 10-May-17 | 30k+ | The following information has been received from NHS Durham Dales, Easington and Sedgfield CCG. OCCG has received this data since April 16.  Data is password protected with the password in another email, however these are saved together on the I Drive.<br><br>• NHS NUMBER<br>• NHS No. Check<br>• POSTCODE<br>• Patient Date of Birth<br>• Age at attendance<br>• PDSEX<br>• Practice code<br>• Attendance date<br>• SERVICE TYPE REQUESTED<br>• ICD-10 Code<br><br>The table below summarises the amount of patient data that has been received:<br><br>Month Patient Numbers<br>April 16 3555<br>May 16 3253<br>June 16 3199 | Digital Information - Received via NHS.net and stored on CCG Network |

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| | | | | July 16 3025<br>August 16 3305<br>September 16 3191<br>October 16 3065<br>November 16 3087<br>December 16 2720<br>TOTAL 28,400<br><br>The incident has arisen, due to Intrahealth contacting the CCG directly to ask why this data hadn't been uploaded to SUS on their behalf.<br><br>Following a further investigation to following files have also been discovered:<br>in the performance files and become aware of 2 providers who have been supplying personal identifiable patient data (PID) to the <Redacted> . The 2 providers are:<br><br>• Transport for Sick Children<br>• Spire Healthcare<br><br>We have backtracked to find out how long we have been receiving data.<br><br>Transport for sick Children: | |

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| | | | | PID (names of patients and some patient addresses) has been received by Oldham CCG from April 2014 until June 2016.<br><br>The table below illustrates the number of incidents broken down into years:<br><br>Year Numbers<br>2014-15 597<br>2015-16 500<br>2016-17 150<br>TOTAL 1,247<br><br>Spire Healthcare<br><br>Oldham CCG has been receiving PID (NHS numbers) from SPIRE redacted@nhs.net. PID has been sent from June 2016 – December 2016 and the number of incidents is 1,382.<br><br>We've reviewed the 2015/16 performance data stored on the I drive and have found:<br>• Data from BMI Highfield that discloses NHS numbers. It is one piece of data and it lists the NHS | |

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| | | | | numbers of 23 patients.<br>• Care UK have been supplying patient gender and date of birth. This has been taking place since June 2014 to December 2016. Each month there are between 1100 to 1500 individual patient records so at an estimate (45,000). | |
| IGI/8216 | UNITED LINCOLNSHIRE HOSPITALS NHS TRUST | 03-May-17 | 15 | 15 patient letters sent from the ophthalmology clinic to GP's that were not the patients. | Clinic letters- full patient details, medical history and current medical issues detailed. |
| IGI/8055 | NHS South Worcestershire CCG | 20-Apr-17 | 1 | Incident in relation to a HR investigation meeting that took place about a member of staff under investigation.  The meeting was recorded on an unsecured audio device which was used by another member of staff and the file was accessed.  The audio file was saved but not deleted and the device was placed back in a drawer in error | HR Investigation Meeting |
| IGI/8066 | GUY'S AND ST THOMAS' NHS FOUNDATION TRUST | 11-Apr-17 | 2784 | An incorrect file was submitted for the 2016 Children and Young People's Inpatient and Day Case Survey, in which the file contained an additional data field.  This was reported by the survey contractor to the Care Quality Commission, | Additional field included in error was NHS Number.<br>The dataset also includes first name, surname, address, postcode, month and year of birth, gender and ethnicity which are approved under |

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| | | | | which informed the Trust.  The file was submitted securely, and the survey contractor confirmed destruction. | the Section 251 support for this survey. |
| IGI/8065 | GUY'S AND ST THOMAS' NHS FOUNDATION TRUST | 11-Apr-17 | 3307 | An incorrect file was submitted for the 2016 Children and Young People's Inpatient and Day Case Survey, which file contained additional data fields.  This was reported by the survey contractor to the Care Quality Commission, which informed the Trust.  The file was submitted securely, and the survey contractor confirmed destruction. | Additional fields included in error were NHS Number, date of birth, age in days, and internal patient identifier.<br>The dataset also includes first name, surname, address, postcode, month and year of birth, gender and ethnicity which are approved under the Section 251 support for this survey. |
| IGI/8064 | OXFORD UNIVERSITY HOSPITALS NHS FOUNDATION TRUST | 21-Apr-17 | 1 | Local authority made a subject access request to access a patient's records, providing consent that had been provided for housing application. This consent did not detail disclosure of medical records. | Patient data |
| IGI/8039 | Welton Family Health Centre (C83037) | 18-Apr-17 | Approx 400 although some were undeliverable, and some did not contain actual names | A group of patients had given consent for their email addresses to be used for survey purposes. These addresses were sorted into four groups and a survey was planned. Two members of staff were involved in producing the survey proforma and sending this | Patient email address only |

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| | | | | to those patients to glean their feedback. The name of the group only appeared in the address box and no email addresses were visible on sending and the staff were totally unaware that these would be disclosed because of their action. A recent upgrade to the practice NHS net email system resulted in the BCC option not being routinely visible and the staff were not aware that they needed to adjust their settings to include this. Surveys are not emailed to these groups frequently (approx. every 18months) and it is usual practise to use the BCC option. This disclosure was a result of human error. The only confidential information disclosed was the email address and there was no confidential information contained within the body of the email. Of the approx. 400 email addresses in total spread between the four separate emails approx. 50 were undeliverable and many of the remaining email addresses did not contain names of the patients and were therefore not attributable to individuals. As soon as this was | |

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| | | | | discovered we sent a response acknowledging the error to all in the group (one email with BCC used) and contacted our local NHS IG Support specialist, redacted for advice and guidance. NHS England were also subsequently made aware of the incident. We tried to recall the email with support from the local IT service desk but unfortunately this was not possible due to our system configuration. A DATIX form was completed and sent) and the matter was highlighted to staff and discussed as a major significant event within the practice. A letter is in the process of being drafted which will be sent to all affected by our actions explaining what happened and the results of the investigation and the actions taken. Any complaints received as a result of this incident will be dealt with through our normal complaints procedure. A protocol is being drawn up and shared with all staff involved in email communication. Arden and Gems will also set up a communication to all GP practices | |

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| | | | | across Lincolnshire reminding staff of email etiquette. | |
| IGI/8029 | DERBY HOSPITALS NHS FOUNDATION TRUST | 14-Apr-17 | 7 | A junior doctor working in ED took documentation home in a bag but left the bag in the car throughout the evening/night.  When the doctor went out to the car she noticed the front window was smashed and the bag containing the documentation and her ED scrubs had gone. The documentation included the patient's hospital ID labels (name, address, date of birth and NHS number) along with clinical history taken for 7 patients who this doctor treated in ED. | Patient name, address, date of birth, NHS number and clinical history for 7 patients taken during their visit to ED.  2 patient's history involved mental health information, one patient history involved reference to testing for STD. |
| IGI/8083 | EAST KENT HOSPITALS UNIVERSITY NHS FOUNDATION TRUST | 24-Apr-17 | 1 word | Patients home address disclosed to relative who was not supposed to know it. Grandchild of a patient telephoned hospital switchboard expressing concern for patient's wellbeing and seeking current location as he was en route from far away to see her. Was given name of care home to which she had recently moved. The grandchild had been excluded by the family from knowing the address as he is considered a threat to his grandmother. There is | Name of care home, but no contact details |

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| | | | | police involvement, but the hospitals Trust was not aware of this. | |
| IGI/8023 | Derbyshire Community Health Services NHS Trust (East Midlands) | 13-Apr-17 | 1 individual | Respiratory Nurse transferred a patient summary from a folder in the boot of her car into her work bag. When she got to the patients home the summary was not in her bag. The only explanation she can give is that today is an exceptionally windy day and it has blown out of her bag. Nurse has searched the patient's home twice and spent 1.5 hours searching the surrounding area with no result. Missing documents are GP summary and referral letter GP summary and referral form contain: Patient details including home address and phone details Past medical conditions Current medication Drug allergies GP details Other services involved | Patient summary relating to one patient. The summary contained: Patient details including home address and phone details Past medical conditions Current medication Drug allergies GP details Other services involved |
| IGI/11531 | KINGSTON HOSPITAL NHS TRUST | 20-Jun-17 | 177 | email from an NHS.net to NHS.net email account was sent with an attachment containing PID. This was then was forwarded to a | The email which originated from outside the Trust was a financial forecast of actual activity for the first 6 months of 2016/2017 for |

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| | | | | Kingston hospital email address. The attachment containing the PID was supposed to have been deleted before being forwarded to the KH email. | Histopathology and contained details of 177 patient's names of which 144 had MRN's and NHS numbers and 80 with MRN's, Hospital number and post codes. |
| IGI/8027 | Leeds Community Healthcare NHS Trust | 13-Apr-17 | 12 | A staff member was checking their patient visit list between patient visits. Extreme weather conditions including high winds and rain, contributed to the staff member losing their grip of the patient list and this being blown out of the reach of the individual. Attempts to catch the list were not successful. | A patient list containing the name, address, date of birth, telephone number, NHS Number, Registered G.P. and reason for appointment of twelve individuals. |
| IGI/8012 | Baschurch Surgery (M82023) | 13-Apr-17 | 1800 | Monthly prescriptions were despatched to NHS Prescription Services in Newcastle using the courier Parcel Force. The box contained prescriptions and medication information relating to over 1800 patients. Parcel Force lost track of the parcel and it was delivered in error to a company in Stoke-on-Trent.<br><br>In order to identify what to do with the parcel an employee of the company opened the parcel, gaining access to the prescriptions. They immediately re-secured the | NHS Patient data - Names, addresses, NHS Numbers and details of medication |

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| | | | | parcel and contacted NHS Business Services Authority. NHSBSA contacted the GP Practice and the Practice Manager made contact with Parcel Force who arranged for the parcel to be collected and delivered to the correct address. | |
| IGI/8043 | NOTTINGHAM UNIVERSITY HOSPITALS NHS TRUST | 11-Apr-17 | 1 | A dictated letter that disclosed the address of a child in foster care was sent to the biological parents. The dictation specified that no information about the child's address must be disclosed to either parent. This was overlooked. | Patient's home address disclosed. |
| IGI/8040 | WYE VALLEY NHS TRUST (RLQ) | 18-Apr-17 | 1 | Incorrect referral letter placed in file, patient had access to this information for five weeks | referral letter details |
| IGI/8025 | NHS Coastal West Sussex CCG | 13-Apr-17 | 1800 | The CCG is re-procuring a continence products service, a new service provider has been identified and due diligence activity is currently underway prior to contract completion. Without CCG knowledge or permission, the current service provider transferred CCG patient data to the new provider. | Name, date of birth, NHS number, continence requirements |

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| IGI/8041 | WYE VALLEY NHS TRUST (RLQ) | 06-Apr-17 | 1 | Pt was discharged from WVT with and EDS, medication list and Summary care record for another pt. | EDS information medication list summary care record |
| IGI/7978 | UNIVERSITY HOSPITALS COVENTRY AND WARWICKSHIRE NHS | 05-Apr-17 | 159 | Member of the ESR & Workforce Information team sent leavers spread sheets to 24 internal recipients and 2 external partner organisations as per normal process, but attached the incorrect file that contained personal sensitive information<br><br>An Excel spread sheet of staff leavers containing 2 tabs with personal sensitive information for 159 staff. | - 94 staff full names with NI numbers, gender, job tiles, length of service, email address, leaving date, re-hire date (where applicable)<br>- 65 staff full names with NI numbers, gender, ethnicity, contracted hours, pay scale, length of service, leaving date, re-hire date (where applicable), reason for leaving (e.g. dismissal) |